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~~'e argne that. the provision of more fiiel-efficient cars shonld be analyzed in the
frnmework of a mnlt.i-dimensional product. placement decision where attribntes
are dependent. This depencíency arises becanse fiiel-efliciency is linked to certain
ae-roclynamic shapes. We show that the presence of this constraint. may rednce the
incentives to provide fiiel-eflïciency. In eqiulibrium cars become more similar and
aeroclynamic ~rs fiiel prices incrcase. However, the provicleci level of fiiel-efficiency
falls short of the social optimal one snch that, a mininnnn fnel economy standard
is called for.l. Introduction
Is the car indnst.ry willing to introdnce more fuel-efficient. vehicles? And if not,
why~? How will the car indnst.ry react if a fuel efficiency standard is imposed?
These questions have becorne the snbject of heated debate among the car indnstry
and ecological orgarrizat.ions like Greenpeace. The focus is on the technological
feasibility and marketability of a fnel efficient car (henceforth FEC) with a gas
mileage of only 3 liters per hundred kilometers. The car industry claims that
an FEC c~ould already be supplied to t.he market bnt. wonld be offered with less
c~omfort. at a higher price.' Greenpeace, however, has shown that these arguments
are at. best, exaggerated. Greenpeace redesigned a Renault Twingo and thereby
rednced its gas consurnpt.ion from 5.6 t.o 3.2 liter, per hundred kilomet.ers withoitt.
affecting neither cornfort nor performance of the original modcl.
In t,his paper we claim that. the car industry is rehtctant to offer the FEC he-
cause the provision of higher firel eHiciency implies a modification of the att.ribnte
mix of their models which in tnrn may deteriorate theár c~.ompetit.ive pusit.ion in t.he
outpnt. market. Consider that. an improvement. of fitel efficiency can be achicved
tlrrongh more aerodynamic shapes, less weight, and bet.ter performing engines.Z
'See Albert Caspers, PDG Ford, and David J. Herman, PDG Opel, in Wirtschaftswoche
(1995). Reduced comfort stems from the necessity that an FEC must be a lightweighted car.
Potential buyers have to dispense with heavy equipment such as air-conditioning and~or stearing
aid (Blick durch die Wirtschaft (1996)).
2Greenpeace modified the Twingo at these three levels: first, they improved the aerodynamics
by 3001o changing the rear and front of the car. Second, they reduced the total weight hy 20"10
1These means are linked to other prodnct attribntes such as size, styling, low noise
and vibrat.ion highly valned by consnmers.3 bloreover, high fnel economy itself is
also one of these desirable vehicle attributes. Its provision should therefore not be
seen as an end in itself bnt as a resitlt. of a prodnct placement. decision reflect.ing
t.he different trade-off's bet.ween several dependent at.tribnt.es. Hence, the FEC
shoi~ld resnlt from an equilibrium attribute choice.
Our paper stiidies this argument in t.he framework of a simple t,wo-dimensional
product cíifferentiation model. We consider competition between dnopolistic car
prodncers whose vehicles are vertically (qnality) and horizontally (variety) differ-
eutiated. Vertical differentiation arises from the fact that all consnmers prefer
a more fnel efficient car if offered at t,he same price. Consnmers differ in their
preferences for the shape (styling) of a car. For instance, some prefer a`t.ln~ee-box
saloon' to a`5-door hatchback'. These differences in shape generat.e horizontal
differentiation in the car market. hi eqnilibrium firms have to deternune a mix
of the vertical and the horizontal ,tttribntc~,. The key chscrvation is that thcse
attribntes are dependent., i.e., a]vgh fitel efíïciency can only be aclueved if the
car takes on a specific aerodynamic shape. The objective is t.hen to derive t.he
eqnilibrinm mix of attribittes and its comparative st.at.ic properties.
making use of more lightweighted materials. Thírd, they redesigned the engine of the car (Le
Journal de Geneve (199Fi)).
30ther attributes include acceleration and handling, safety, comfort reliability, passenger-
and load carrving capacity (see, National Research Council (1992), p. 30).
~Aerocl~-namic' clrag is an important. cleterminant for fitel economy. It is a forc~e
opposiug the mot.ion of a~~ehicle tltat resnlts from t.he resistanc,c~ of the ambient~air
to tl~tc movernent of the vehicle t.hrongh it.." According to the Nai.iona] Research
Connc'il (1992) recinc~t.ions of 20Io in aerod,ynanric drag coefficients are possibly
leadiug to an improvement of fnel ec'onomy of abont. 5~Io. Windtnnnel tests show
chat. there only exist. c~ertain opt.inral shapes minimizing gas c~onstrmption. Hen~e,
firms are forcecl to approac~,h t,heses shapes when improving fitel effit'iency tluoirgh
bet.ter aerodynanucs. This clepenclency implies t,hat c~ars become more and more
sitnilar whenever t.heir 6re1 efficiency rises. Therefore, the variet.y of t.he cars'
exterior dec~reases.`'
~'e hncl t.lrat a t.echnology constraint. affects thc willingness of c'ar producers to
provide fuel efiicient. c~ars. Fnrthermore, we show t.hat car procíncers provicle too
little firel efpicienay. The int.nition comes in two st.eps. First, a positive clemturcl
effect ~uises as increasing qnalit}~ attracts c'onstrmors. This effec~t is stronger in the
presence of a technology constraiut. since a higher qualit.y implies less horizontal
differentiat.ion. As a resiilt demancl is more qnality c~ltt"stic in eqnilibrintn. Tlre
t"Fuel economy might he increaserl hy rcdesiguing the vehiclr exterior to rerlure the aer~r
dVnamic drag forces that consutne a substantial proportion of the fitel enargc at Ligó spc~ecl.,"
(National I2escarclt Comtcil (1092), p. 34). bíacGready (1989) computes that. the aerodynamic
drag determines about ï~q~ to 807 of the force to be overcome when driving a titeady state
cycle at 55-65 tu.p.h..
SSimilar Trade-offs between quality chazacteristics may also be ímportant for cars: a higher
weigltt increases gas consumption but improves the road-behavior of a car; expanding the glas
surface means better visibility and hence safety but increases the need for airconditioning which
iu turn increases weighr, thus gas consumption.
3second force is strategic. Better aerodynamics imply a negative strategic effect..
Thís effect is more pronounced in t.hc presence of a t.c,~chnology constaaint since
the dcrrease in horizontal differentiation renders price competit.ion fiercer thns
iuclircing more aggressive price responses. Therefore, car prodncers crncíerinvest.
iu fitel efficiency in order not to induce an aggressive rc~ponse by the cornpet,it.or.
Onr compatat.ive static resnlts suggest that. wheu consumers care less abont
fuel economy, that is when real gasoline pricc~s are low, the ]evel of sctpplied
fnel economy is also low. This reflects t.he sitaation in t.he US where gasoline
is relativcly inexpensive. The correlation bet.ween firel prices and improvements
in the fuel ec:onomy of cars has been observecí by the National R.esearch Conncil
(1992), p. 13 - 16)) who st.ates: "Between 1975 aud 1991 the fnel economy
of the average new car in t.he US improved by ronghly 76 perce.nt...The ratc of
improvement in fnel ec:onomy varied over t,he period. Siguifieant, gains wc~re macie
dnring the carly yeara...more modest gains were~ made from 1981 to 1988, and
dec~lines occnrred from 1985 to 1991-..The rlcc~linin~; real prire of g~csoline sinre
1cJ81 h~~5 clisconraged firrt.hcr improvcmc~nts".
Clcarly, a regtilator shonld ronsider possible extenialitie, fitel cr.onorny gen-
erat.es on motor vehicle emissions. This was one of the motivat.ions of the U.S.
Go~.ernment to introduce Corporate Average Fnel Economy (CAFE) stanctards.
A regnlator shonld also incorporate potent.ial costs chte t,o the fact. that. a c~otr-
4tiutuer ha.ti to btry a~-clrich~ ~aith othi~r attribntcs thau Lc rn' shc othcrwist~ ~-ottltl
ha:-c~ bonght. In oitr modt~l ~r utinitntun fncl cconotuy' struidard iti alwa}.s bt~ucficial.
Siuce firms compE~te for the mxrgiual consumer thet' iurdt~rincctit. in qnality as this
generatos au ag~ressive responsc by the cornpet.itor. Otn~ resttlts also iudicate that.
t.hc~rt~ is more neerl for fnel ccaronry. regnlatiat when fnel priccti are Li~h.
In spitc of the fact t.hat prodncts snch ~is cars consist of several att.ribntcs,
prnclnct. placement decisions are itsttally analyzed in modols of oni~ ditnensioual
product diffcrent.iation. In theac models all product xttribut.es are snrrunarize~d iu
n siug'Ic parametc~r. It. is jitst trct~utly~ that the litcratnre on pro~lnct tliffert~ntiatiou
has taken np Hte topic of firtus' prodnct placement dccisions iu multi-~limensional
prothtct spacc~s.t' So far the tnajor focns of t lus litcratnre ha,ti been tho stndv of t he
pure c~ffect of competiti~-e positioniug nloul; each clinrctrsiorr. This rcquiros tht~ a5-
snmption of attribute independence- firms can pick cach attribtttF in~lepc~ndently-
of the choice of other prodnct charactoristics. As ~re sa~~. ahovc this asstuuption
rnay bc nnsatisfactory. for somE~ nrarkets.
The literatnrc closest t.o onr stndy- inclnclE~ papf~rs ~y.Lich ktiglrlight ~liffercnt
irnplications of attribute dependence snch tts Degryse (1~D6), Cauoy ~in~l Pcitz
(199i), and Degryse and Irmen (199i). DegrySe (1996) cliscusses attrihnt.e cle-
FSre. c.g., Economides (198tJ) and (1993). Neven and Tliisse (1900), Hirl~~ ct. al. (1990).
Tabuchi (1~J94), Vandenbosch xnd ~Veinberg (1995), Ansari et. al. (1997), Irm~u nnd Thisse
(19~J8).pendence bet.ween horizontal and ~.erti~~al differentiation r~~itli an applic~atiou to
banking. In his paper banks face a dis~~rets ~,hoice be~twc~en a high and fi low sc~r-
cice qn~lity . In contr~st, this paper allows for a oont.innons qnality choire. Canoy
and Peitz (1997) support onr conje~tnre that attribi~te dependenceis ~tn important
phenomenon for t.he analysis of market strnc~f.iire. They start. from the observ~-
tion t.hat siibrnarkets for high qnalit.y and low~nality are markedly different. In
thoir mode~l exogeno~isly given variants in the low-quality range are identical for
all c~onsiimers. Consnmers strongly disagree abont t.he vahie of v,uiants in thc~
liigL qiialit.y segmont. Ileuce, qiialit,y and variety are dependent biit. pro~liict at-
tribntos ~~re exogenrnisly given. In contr~~st, onr paper endogenizes the attribiite
rnix sirpplied by the firins. Degryse and Irmvn (1997) st.ndy a model where .rt-
tribute dc~~~endence arises indimct.ly sin~~e the qualit.y offered by a firm determines
th~~ prefc~rencF intensitp ~~onsinners att~tc~li to its procluct. On tlie contrary, in this
p~r~x~r ~~~, moclcl attril,nti, de~~x~ndence dirc~ctly via a te~~lmology ~~onst.raint.
'Phc~ rem.~iuder of tho pap~,r is nrganized in th~ followino ~a~av. Srction 2 in-
tro~hicea the model. Se~~tioii 3 soh.es for the non-cooperative ~~yiulibrinm ynalir~~
and sPC~tion 4 dis~nsses w~lfare ~~onsiderations. Se~~tion 5 ~~on~~lndes-
G2. The Model
Iu tltis sec~t-ion, we prasent a moclel of two climensional prorluct. differeut.iat.ion
whic~h stndics the trade-off of chtopolistic~ c~ar produc~ers sketc~hed out in the in-
trodnc~tion. Cars can be vertically and horizont.ally differetrtiated. The vertic~al
c~harac~teristic is a car's firel c~onsnmpt.ion, the horizontal c~haract.erist.ic is its shape.
'hlto partic~ttlarity of onr modc~l is that a lo~i~ Icwel of fucl c~onsumptiou c~an only
he providecl if the automobiles approac~h a specific~ aerocíynatnic shape. In other
worcls, a hi~her quality inevit.ably reqiurc~s a variet,y c~loscr t.o the c~ompetit.or's
proclnct, thns reduc-in~ ilte dc~gree of horizontal product. differentiation in the
tuarket. 'I'Lis feactue i~ introchtc~ed via a tec}mology c.onst.raint.
Considcr a market. wlterc~ two firms offer one prodnc~t each. Thc~ prodnct vari-
ants are c~harac~terizcci by a varictal aud a c}nalit,y c harac~teristic, i.c., by the firms'
loc,ation in SR'`. Firm A's loc~at.ion is gicen by a vector (f1, s~) whc~re~as firrn E3's
loc~ation is given by (B, s~) . The c~apital let.ters A and 6 denote thc~ firtns' varicty
ancl sA, sB t}tc~ir respFCtivc c}n~ilii~y.
There ia a continnum of constnners clistrihuted over the tmit. interval ac~.c~orcling
to a ntuform density fimction. Wit}tout loss of generality, we norrnalize t.he total
popnlation to 1. Each consumer is characterized hy his most preferred prodnct.
variet,y z. Constnners have a c~onditional indirect ntility firnction V, (z) , i- A, B.
A c~onsitmer buying brand A enjoys a ntility ec}ual to (a similar expression holds
7for :c purc h~so of brand L3)
~~,4 ~z~ - 7' i- fLtiA - jlA -~2 -
~~ ktc~re
t' - ~ross sttrphis
B - m~irginal willingness to pay for qnalit.y
s~ - quality of branci A
p,a - firm A's price
z - tlre c~onsnmer'a preferrcd ~-ariet,}-
A - cariet.y pro~-icled by firm A
Cnnsinners ltavc nnit detnands. Fitrthcrmore, it. is assnrned that v is larKe
c~non~h for all c~onsnmers t.o hny at thc price ec}uilibrium c~orrespouclin~ to anv
loc~ation pair. The deinand for variant A is t.hen clefine~cl :~s the matss of c-onstttners
For ultout ~~nriant (.1..~:t) in~ ~t'eakly prcferred Io (B..tirr) . i.c~., [-,t (ti) ? Ly (z).
Obsc~r~-c~ t.hat. B~ 0 is thc~ sttmc for aIl cousnmc~rs. This c~an bc~ jnstific~cl
by pointing ont thar a qnality iinpro~ement means et IugLc~r rniles-per-gallon
performance, hence savin~s in operational c~osts. Sine~c, rars ha~-c~ a gi~-en total
lifetime cnileage t.}iese savings will approximatc~h- be t.hc~ 5amea for eac~lt ronstnner.~
~This is true if ~~~e abstract from the facts 1}iat the LifFtime mileage tnay be dri~-en o~.er differing
rime inrPnals, or that the car ma} be sold hefrire the Iife~tim~ miloa{;e Ita. been reac~he~d.
1('hxn~es in N ~~nn therefore be~ intorpretecí as reflec~t.ing fln~~tnartions of thc fiiel
pri~ c."
('onsnmcrs diartigrec~ abont thcir most. preferrE~l ~-~tiriety. This capturea an im-
portant fc,at.iue of t ho c~ar market ~ehere consnmers are knoN.n t.o cliffer wit.h respee~t
to their likink of brsnd spec~ific~ designs. This aspect. appears in the utility 6mc~t.ion
of ec(itation (2.1) .~s a stanclartl qnadratic transportation cost fimc~tion wit.h a per
nnit transportat.ion rate normalized to eqnal 1.
[n the next sa~tion we stndy how firms determine the level of fnel ~~orLSiunption
in n symmetri~~ equilibrinm. The partic~nlrtirity of this cle~~isiou is that a low level
oF fiiel consumption t`c2n only be provided if the automobiles appronrh a spcY~ific~
aerocíyunmit~ slr~pe. The qnest.ion is t.hcu how t.o incorporate t.his featitre in
a symmetric~l way int.o the model. Deiiote s the highest. possiblc quttlity. It.
~~:nr be thonght of as being the minim~l amomrt of gttis a c~ar nceds to c~rn~cr rt
himdred kilometers. ~1'e .~siime that the aeroclti-naruic~atlly optirnal shtcpc lies in
t.he middle of thc unit intervaL In tc~rms of consitrner prnferences thiti ineans that it
rorresponds to thc median preference for variet.~-. Fnrthermore, firm .9 is lo~ ~rtecl
t.o thc left and firm B to the right of 1~2. Henre, neither firm htr.5 ~tn initia!
culv~nt~Ke of beiug c~loser to t.he opt.imal qu~lity. The tec~hnological constraint
~Alten~xtivi~lp B mat prox~ en~ irottmcntal concern oE thc population.
~~t~lticlt littks qn~tlit}~ ancl variety is linoar xnd ~i~.c~tt b}~
B - 1-ry.sH.
The parameter y is non negatice snch that. an increase in cpt~lity shifts both
v~rieties towards thc center of the nnit segment. It mexstu~ES the nnits of horizontal
differ~~ntiation firms have to give up for an aclditional nnit of yuality. Giv~-st tlris
setttp firm A can only improve sA as long as 0 G A - y. s~ C 1~2. Sitttilarly, firtn
B r~an inr'~rease sB only if 1~2 C B- I- y. slj G 1 holcls. This introdnces an
ttpper bounrl on ry, i.e., ry C 1~2s".s
In order to c~aptt~rc the notion of qualit,c ~~.e assnme th~tt at fixecl pricas no
r~r,n,ntner is worsc~off ~-hen the yrrality of either good improves, i.e., c~V, (z) ~r7s, 1
0 for nll z anri z-.A. B. This introduccs rtn itpper bonnd on thc interat~tiou
p,trarnr~ter and ~~.e obtain 0 G y G B. Hettce, ~ti-e have
OCryCmin{ 1 .B}.
lll~s 111
Prodaction is sttc~h tttat t.he 1c~-el of yu~ilit,y- does nor affer~t ~~ariahlc~ r.r~st5 ~r}ti~~lt
`tObser~e that the size oE ~ also determines thn le~rl of g~s cousumption that can be reachrd
cia aerod~ namic optimization. Indeed, if w is high an improvement in the aerodynarnics is uot a
~er}~ efficient de~ice to reduce fuel consumption. Thua, the size of -~ differs for different segmenis
of ttte car rnarket.
1U,~r~~ normalizecl to zer~. Howecer, there is ti fixt~d ~~ost ~~.tisociatec] with research and
~ li,~.elopment of an acrodyurcmi~~ dc~sign gi~.en by C (s, ) - cs;~2. The qnaciratic
form of th~~ ~~nst fiin~~tion reflects climinishiug retiirns of investment. in cpialit,y.
TLis ~~otit strn~~tnre seems re~uonable for the shape of ~~~rs sinee it is cleternvnecl
Ix~forc~ hrocln~~tion st:crt. Henc~e, profit fiiu~tions are
~~~P,.~~,s„s.i~-P,~~ÍPt,P~.st,siJ-C~s~~, ~,J-A,B.
3. The Nvn-Cuoperative Quality Game
In thiti section ~~~e stndv th~~ symn~~rric subgame p~~rfect ~~nilibriutn of the follow-
ing two -stage garne. At the first stage, firms ~.Loose the position oI t h~ir v~~riant.
in t.he proclnct space [0, 1] x[0, s]. Dne to th~~ te~~hnologp ~~onstraint th~ ~~lioi~~c~ of
qn~lity detFrmines irnpli~~itly tlie prodn~~t's ~-ariet~~. Heu~~e, t.he coiLStretiine~l prod-
n~~t. spFtice is one ~limi~nsion~l xnd firms i~hoose s, E[0, 1~2ry] . At the secon~l stage
firrns c~ompete in pri~~es. Th~ tno titagc naturc~ of the qame reHort, il~i~ f~u ~ f}i,it
prodrn~t characterist.i~~~s su~~h as t.he shape of a ~~ar ancl its asso~~iatecl fi~el consnmp-
tion are oftcn lc~s flexible than prices. Sert.ion 3.1 qives the solntion to t.he se~~rnicl
stage price ~ame. The non~ooperative sohrtion of the first stage qiiality ~ame is
present.ed in sc;ction 3.2.
113.1. The Price Game
Let ~~onsnmers compare t.heir preference for low gas ~.onsiiinption, tho sLapi~. aucl
the pricc~ of the two ~~ars available in the market. This tradc~off gi~-es rise to a
mar~inal r~onsnmer location z E[0, 1~. Denot.e the horizontal distance bet~.oc~n
tlre two brands 0- B- A- 1- ry(s~ f sA). Then,
Irrr - p~ f B (s~ - se) ~ 1 f 7(.ti'n - 5'rr)
?,, ?
~~Iririr ~let.ermiiies t,hi~ firins' demand fnnctions in a standa~rd way. Expli~~itlv,
cire ~~btainti





Pirm B's demand is i[nplicitl~~ given as DB - 1- D,~.
~~'r~ ran already ~et a first iiriderstandin~; nf li~w ~; affc~~ts the ont~~oino of tlu~
K~~rne li~- ant~lyzing its irrrpact oii demand. ~~'r, ha~-e
~~~,~ ) ) 0 ~p g,y -





H~~nrc, in the i~c~i~hborhood of :~ symmetri~~ ont~~ome more ~~onsnmers su-it~~]i
hrands in response to a c~hange in pri~c or qnality as ry in~~reases. This ht~s the
following implications. nn the one hatid, the procision of a higher qnality be~omes
niore .~ttractive bec2iise its positive impa~~t. on dernand is more prononn~~.ecL nn
tLe other li~u~cL for given qualit.ies deru~uid becomes niore pri~~e eltisti~~ wliic}i
i~u~ili~s locvi,r pri~~c~s at ~r~nilibriimi. Tlie qnestion is then ~~.hich of tlie iw.o opposing
c~tfc~~ts elocuiuates at the eq~iilibriiitn. In order t,o get the complete pi~~tnre ~ti-o first.
li.w~ to St.n~l}~ thc~ prii~i~ c,~~nilibciiun in tnor~~ ~lr~t~il.
StrtLightforwt~rd ciunpnt.~t.ions pic~ld tL~~ pri~~c c~c~nilibriiitri ~4ti
~ H
T~n - e~ ~1 f 3(s,~ - sQ)~ f 3 ~sa - ae) , (3.1)
B
Fi~ - 0~1 f 3(str - s~)~ f 3(sB - s,t) ~32)
Three remarks ~ire in order. Fu~st, observe thzit the cr~nilibriniu pri~~e consists
of t,wo components. The first ~,omponent reAe~~bs the degree of horizoutal prodiict.
~lifferentiation.'~ It dcepends on the interaction parameter ~ ~~5 well ~s on thc
~~The first term of (3.1) cau actuallv be w.rittc~n ~s ,~ (2 t B t A) ~3 whereas the first term of
13pro~~idcd quality le~-els. The second component shows the picre effec~t of ~.c~rtiral
clifferentiation. It is the more prononnc~ed thc~ higher the c~onsnmers' ~c-illingness
to pay for a ynality improvement, and the more prodnc~ts are differentiated with
respe~t. to qnalit.v.
Second, a5 expectcd we have
r7p~~c~ry G 0. i- A, B.
Hence, priee c~ompetit.ion becomes tongher as ry inc~rcases. For a given level of
qiialit.y firms locations ari the line move closer t.lnis intensifying price ~ompetition
along the variet.al oharact.erist.ic. Accordingly, at t.he price eqnilibrium demand
fimr~tions become more price elastic.
Third. unlike standard models ofqnality c~hoi~e a qiiality improvement. of one's




ds, - 3 2s,
The reason is t.he following. It is easv to show that. for a11 admissible ~-aluc~~~ nf
~ an increase in s, shifts firm i's best. reply ontward. This allows for a higher p, in
spit.e of the fact that firm j's best reply shifts inwards as s, angments as long as
(3.2) i, equal to ,~ (4 - B- A) ~3. Both expre~~ions c~,inrid~ aith the equilibrium prices of the
standard Hotelling mode] with quadratic tran~porYation co~ts (sea d'Aspremont et al. (1979~).
I~ry is ,nffi~~icntl~~ low. If ry 1 y a highc~r qnalit.y implies ~rn inward sliift. of .j'n be~t
r~~lilti~ xt. lct~st t~1~i~~e ~Gti hig a5 tlie ont~s-ar~l sluft of i's best. reply. Thiis, horizontal
~liHer~~iitie~finu de~~rE~~uc~s to snch an extent that the ensning intensifi~~ation of pric.e
~~ouihetition ~long this c~hara~~teristi~~ reqnires g~; to fall in eqnilibrinm. It. is then
interetitiug to Stndy how t11e tcs~hnology constraint affects firms' choi~~e of qnality
at. the first stage of the game.
3.2. The Quality Game
1J~.~ilttatrd ~et t,he price cclitilibrinm thc marginal ~~ottsnmcr location z~ is givi~n by
B(sn -~s~a) f J(3 -~ i i~s~:a - ~s~~l )
a:~
sn~~h that Firm A's clernand fim~~tion h~~comes
DA (~5,4, ~H) -
1 for sq - sQ ~(~ [3 - y(s~ - sB)] ~N
; fnr 0 [3 - "i ~~sn - s~i)~ ~A ~ s.q - .ti~r
~ -0 [3 f ry (.tiA - sci)~ ~N
0 for -~ [3 f ry(sA - sB)~ ~B ~ s,~ - s~
AKain. demand for firm B equals 1- D.~. Firrns maximizc profits
[B (sA - sB) f ~(3 f ry( s,~ -.s8))~I ~ z
~A - 18~1 - 2SA
1J~Q ('SB - SA~ rt 0 (3 -~ ~r (SA - 8fi))I ~ ! .~
~~ - lÓ0 - 2'S)3
simultrtnc~onsly w.r.t. their clnr~lity on s, E[0, s] , i- A, B wttere s c 1~2;. This
Ie~ads ro atn overall eynilibrium characterired in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Thcrt~ ~xisYs a unique .SyrrimNtric c~quilibr~iurn in pttrt, sti~atr~~ias
if c~ i~ - 2H1~3~. Tht~ equilibrinm quality is giti.en hy
( 2H - ry l
s'"` - rn~uc jl0 i 1
' 2(3~ ~- 27 )
ti~hile Fquililii~ittni pricc~.5 arr C,,"~ - 0.
Proof: Sc~e~ :~ppenclix.
Propovition 1 shoN-s that tht~ c~qnilibritmi quality offerecl clepencls on N ancl ti.
Observc~ tltat qnalit.y. int~rea-ses in B. Dnring times of irn~rt~~sing fnel prices 1nd~or
hiklmr enciroiuneut~tl t-oncertt, t,he model prtYiicts rnore similxr and aerocl,y-nainit~.
t~ars n.ith lower ga.5 tousnrnption. Castt~rl empirit~ism nonfirins this prc~clit~tiou.
Fnrtherrnore, the pro~.ivion of ynality retltrires that the t~onsitmers marbinal u.il]-
iugnesti to pay for qttnlit~. is snffit~ic~ntly- hi~;h. i.e. B 7 ry~2.tt
~~~orice rhat the lattrr i, ahcays satisfied in our model since the notiott of qualit}' implies
that B ~-.. The second ra~e ~~.here no qualit}~ is taro~.ided is the on~~ where r is sn hi~h that firtus
would make lusses at an~ .~ ~ 0.
1GAlorr~ itiiportr~ntl~~. ~ce hei~t~
ds"`~ 3c f 2~~(4B - -y) d1 --
~(3c ~- 2ryZ)z
c 0.
i.r,., tlie eqnilibrinm quality nneqnivocally falls as ry increa5es. The intiiition
r~omes from t.6e first order ~~ondition of the qnality game, which is
d~r,(s,, s~) ~D ~D; dpi
- P, '~ ~- cs~ - 0, l,7 - f1, B; i ~ 7 (3.5) rls, r7s; c7p~ ds
E~.~~lnation of p, tit the ser,oiid stt~ge eqiiilibriimt ~tind nsitig the fact. thttit.





wtiE~re t.he first terni in sqii~rc brir.kcts rrre:~.5nriw hy lrow mncó firm i r.~~rr it~~rt~~~.5e
its pricc in r~sponae to a m~rKinril increase in qnality while keepinR its dernrinrl
t~onstant. The s~'ond term is the ri~-11's price rear~tion to snch ~i marginal int~re~se.
Intnitively, changes in s, ~nd 7;, c~an only be "demand nentral" if they Icave
t.lif~ position of the marginal coiisiimer iinaffected. Henr'e, in eynilibriiim tlie first
term miLSt be siich that. it, Ieaveti the indirect iitilitr of t.he marginal ~~onsiimer
nnt~hviged. Since a symmetrir~ equilibrium reynires a 50 : 50 split of dein~.nd we
have ~- 1~2 and obtain the value of dp,~ds,~o -i~z from t.otally differentiat.ing





Heure, thc marginal conscuner's marginal ~~illingness t.o pay for ~~ qiialit,y iui-
pro~em~nt rc~flects }iis marginal willingness t.o pay for qnality ancí the rednc.t.ion
in transport.ation costs ~~ssoc~iatod with 2n inward shift of the firms' cflriet~ies.'~
The sc~c~ond t.erm in (3.6) is determined from (3.1) or (3.2) and ~fter imposiiig
tiytnmetry eqii~il t.o13
d~' 1 Bf 3f0
~ls, - - 3 [ 7 ~~ )~ .
Qiialit}- iti an aggretitii~~c~ ~lc~c~i5ion variable siuce the ri~~al reac~ts to a mar~inal
iuc~rc~~se ~ti-it.h ~ti pric~c rednc~t.ion. I3is reac~tion is st.ron~er thc higlx.r ry, i.c~., tLc~
trnigher pric~c~ competit-ion is. Overall. it is c~.~tiily seen that th~ negati~~e cffc~c~t an
inc~rease in ~ h~us on tLe strate~;ic~ term morc~ tlcxn oiitwc~it;lis an~- hositi~~e imliac~t it
r:w h~ti~-c~ nn tli~ martiin;cl c-onsnrnor's mnr~inal willingn~tis to ha~.. Tlnis. snrli an
inc~r~~~Gticr rc~dnres hhe LHS of (3.6) whiclc establishes the c~omparxt.i~~o st.atic~ resiclt.
titatc~cl in (3.~1).
Eqiiilibrinm prices are eqiial to the liorizontll distrui~~c~ of firm5. Prodiu~ts are~
liomogencons w-ith reshect to qnality- so that t.he~ lat.ter has no clirect effec.t. on
~~Obse~.e rhat y(y) - ti.~ is a hyperbola ~,-ith ar~ruaxi - 1~4.
~~~sOf aiurse. insertion oE (3.7) and (3.ti) in (3.G) g9ves c"~ of protiosition 1.
ltipricc~s. However, dne to tho technological const.raint prices depend indirectly on
~~nality. Since a higher qualit,y implies less horizontal differentiation prices fall as
qnalitv increases. hi particnlar nnlike what. is nsnally foimd eqnilibrinm prices




d~,~~ 2 ~3c ~~ - 7) - 2Bry~]
~try - (3c f 2y~)
The sign of dpn`~dry depends on B and c. It. is easily ~rrified that.
dpn` -3c f 3c(8B f 3c)
d~ c0iffycy- ~~
i.e., when c and B are high the equilibrinm price is likely t.o fall in }~. Tliis is the








First.. there is a direct price competition effect which is negative. Leaving quality
imchanged, an increase in y decreases horizont.al differentiation on the line. Price
19t~omperition is more int.ettse thns p"~ mnst fall. Sec~ond, there is an indirE.~~t effec~t
since firrns adapt s"~` to changc~s in 7. From eqnation (3.4) we know that thc
eqnilibriimr qnality falls in ry. Hence, the distance between hhe goods augments
and prit.es ~~an rise.14
4. Optimal Quality Standard
In this snbsection, we disc:nss t.he behavior of a regnlat.or maximizing social welfare
by irnposing a qnalit.y standard s9w. The welfare measnre we nse is a simple addi-
tion nf consnmer and prndncer snrplns. Fnrthermore we inchtde a term captatrirrq
possible externalit.ics fuel economy generates on motor vehicle enussions.
The c~onsnmer sttrphts CS boils down to
i~z
CS - t~ f Bs - (1 - 2rys) - 2~ (rys - x)~ dz.
0
Thc first term is thc gross snrphts eac~h constmier enjoys from purchasin~ one
nnit of the good. The second c~omponent. measures the consnmers' ntility derived
from Gnality s. The last two t.erms are t.he pric~e ~~nstomers pay and thc average
t'tOne might also be interested in the case of semi-collusion whcre the dnopolisos coordinate
their quality decision but compete in prices (RScD carTel). Howe~-er. since aggregate demand
is constaut and yuality an aggressive variable no qualitp will be províderl in equilibrimn. The
intuition is that, apart from costs, the cartel members only care ahout the impact of quality on
own aud ri~~al's prices. Since price compet,ition becomes tougher Eor non negativP } firms arc
hetter off if s- 0(see, Degr}~se and Irmen (1997). p. 15).
~~tr,uts}tortxtion roet ~t rnstomer int~tu:5 ~.lten pnrt~h~~.tiing either brxnd.
~I~1tr hrntlu~~t~r sttrplns PS ~onsists of two romponents and eqnals
PS - [I - 2rys] - c (s)~ .
Thc term in bra~rkets represt~nts total revennt.ti whercav tht. scr~onil is the t~osr
of de~-eloping the yuality level s.
TLt~ p~svible (posit.ive) extentalit,ies fue] cronomy geuerat.es on motor vehicle
c~tuisaiotts rtttd lience the envirortment.a.l qttality, is represettted by ~s, re 1 0.15 For
simplit~ity, we a,tisnme the efFec.t nf ~Inadity, i.e. fnel eronotny, is liroltort.ional to
tht~ datnage of rnotor vt~lu~~lo emissiorts on ~nvironmcntat qttality.
AclilinK ~~onsttmer snrplns CS, prodncer snrplns PS an~l the ext~t,rnalitv term




Notic~e ttt~t TW- cloeti not refit~t~t reveunt~s sini~o the~y r oustitnte o-t pttre recliat.ri-
bntion between producf:rs and atstomers. A Light~r ynnlit~ standard h~tas tlte~n fniu
~'Tlte evidence conmrning the relation hetween fuel econorn}~ and motoc ~~ehicle emission is
mixed. Ikhazzoom (1995) finds for uew cars that increaseri fitel economy }eaves the emission
rate uncltanged. Harrington (1997) also t.akes the aging of cars into account. His flndings show
that a better fucl economy is strongly associated with lower emission rates. Furthermore, when
fitcl economy irnproves, the marginal cost of travel declines, and the demand for travel goes up,
potentially contributing to a degradation of air qualit}'.
21effe~ ts. First, it positively aff~~ts the~ inclirec~t ntility of the c~iistomers. Sc~c~oncl. it
~~hauges thc~ total amount of transportatiou c~osrs c~ust~rners fa~~e. ~LS tLey c~aunot
bnt" t]ic~ir most, prefarrcxl shape. Tlurd, it inc~reases the cleveloprnent ~~osts r(s)'-.
Finally, a óigher qnalit.y stancíarcl gcanerates externalities on the motor vc~hie~lc~
emissionti.
"nc~~ ~ptimal yiiality stanclarcl s"u' is given in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Ass~unc. th,it costs ~rrP .SUCh that thc~ non-coop~rativc~ qnality
c~quilibrium exists. Then the~ optirnal qua]ity standard .v~"" chost'n by a re~ulator
I.S
( rfry -ry 2(Hfa)f7l
s'~ - n7Z7~
Sl 1 r 4(r ~- ry'~)
yCF r)1ita,in p~"` - 1- 2rys"" as ~qnilihrinm prices and s~`~' ~ s"` for all n~ 1 0.
Proof: ~~'c have tc~ maxirnizo T~~' w.r.t.. s nndc~r th~ follnu"ing constraintti:
l. u~n-i~c~gati~~iry ~~f~ PS' :.5~ C~~ r~ ---,~ ~
2. tec~ímology c~onstraint: s C 1~2~r
ít iv thi~n c~asilv ~.eriliecl t.hat th~ first constraint I,inds c~arlic~r iLan thc~ last
~ oustraint. Thc~ first coirstraint is biuding if
c? é- ~4(H ~ r~)~` ~ 20ry(B ~- c2) - 23-;~~ f(2(B f a) f'~)';(2(B f n) f 17~)~ ,'~2.
The scrond clerivative is always negativo. (Z.E.D.
?2Ohsor~-r~ that the eptinral qnality st.auclarcl clepends ou B vtcl the interact.ion
parauioter ~~. ~Iore importantly, N-c, íincl that. s"~' 1 v'"`~ for all adrnissiblc parame-
tor ~-aL~s. Howc~-cr .~ '' cloes not nocessarily increase in 7. The rc~asou is t.hat ryss~
rletertuiucti thc location of the brands in the nnit. interval ancl r.hns t.he Ie~~e1 of total
transportat.iou costs. For low levels of ~, a higher qnalit.y also rc.Klnces aggregate
transportatiou costs. That is, on average consurners like morr~ thc ucrodynamic
styling. Accordingly, s"u' increases in ry. If ry gets larger this forcc disappears and
lo~aer Icvels of s9v' become socially cíesirable. Iu ot.her worcls, the st.vling of cars
becontcs too acroclynamic ~r'
Thc optitnal qnality stanclard iucreases w-hene~-er fncl ect,uotny improves etrvi-
ronmcntal rlnality. Thc reason is that. a rcgiilator has extra iuccntivcs to ,rsh for
higher fitel econorny sinco this generat.es posit.ive extcrnalit.ies. Hcncc, the rlilfer-
ence hetwecn the socially optim.rl qnality standard s'~"' and the market cleterrninecl
firel econorny s"' incretr,ties. Thns, a minimum fnel ecnnomy standanl is rallccl for.
Alternative policies to improve fnel economv are hossible. Ono ~~olicy r,ften





i)~ - d2c(s)z r32TR' ~ -
8.cz ~~~s
(-)
where TR denotes aggre~ate transportation costs.
?3nsod iu prat~titr is to in~ipose excise taxc~ rlesigned to int~rea.tie 6u~1 prit~cs. TLc
idea is to have fix~l prit.es reHect the `trne ~~ost of fnel nse.' [n our model. rhis
polic.y int~re:rses B sinc~e a higlier fitel price angments r'onsumers' savings dne to a
bt~trer g:GS mileage Accordingly, firms provide a ltigher qnality sn". Hou.e~.c~r, the
gap betu.cen s'~" and s"` widens.t'
5. Concluding Remarks
The dist~ttssion aboitt t.he inceritives to provide fttel~~fficicnt t~ars is likely to remain
intt~usc~ sint~e real fnel prit~eti are high and en~~ironmental cait~ern grou~in~;. Oitr
px}ier pr~itrts to an argnment that, among otlters, helps to explain tlte mint~t~tnt
attititclt~ of t}tt~ ~ar indttst,ry to sttpPly the market. u-ith t-hc F)JC:.
~Ve iutderstand the pro~-ision of a part,ictilar prochx t attrihnt.e ,tws part of a
unilti-ditnensional decision problem. TLe restiltinK eqnilibritun set of at.taibntes
rcfíc~ ts demaucl arnl strategit~ t~onsiderations. Fnrtítcrmore, wo ar~nt~ tLat firtns
mrry f~tcc~ a rottstraiuctl }irotlnt~t spat~c antl sltou- tltat a tt~t~}tunlogit~al t~untitraittt
m~ty itrtply disitx~enri~es to pro~-ide t}nality.
Our resnlts }uglilight that the shapes of c~ars bet~otne more similar rtiircl ~terotly-
namir~ as t~onsitmers' marginal u-illitigtress to pay for a better gas tnilcage increases.
~'Other policies ro influence fitel econom} are fee.ti For constuners bnyin~ a beloN. a~era~;r
fuel ocouutny and rebates fur those buyin~ aboce average fitel ecouom} cxrs (see alsu Nariuual
Resetirch Couucil (1902. p.17f)).
~íIn sliitc rif this ttu~ m.~rkc~t d~,c~~rtuined level of fitel eflirieu~y falls short of t.he so~~ial
ni,ti~uxl one ~~.hi~~h siyiports ttte iinp~siti~n of fnol ~~~onomy standard5 like CAFE.
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2cJ6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
~~'~~ procecd ~~.ti follou.s. First, we soh~c for the symmetri~~ ~yiiilibrinm in qnalit~~
aiid di~~-c]op a ~onditioii on c iinder w}iicli the profit. fimctions at.t.ain a tntixiinnm at
tLis ~~~tnilibrinm. SecoucL w.e shoN- that nndcr this ~~ondit.ion there is iio pr~fitable
~iociation in the Strategy tipace. We dertl explicitly with firm A. By tivm~netrv,
Hii~ s~~mc: resnlt holds for firm L3 .
1. Firui A's jxofit at. ctie pricF~ eyuilihrinm is of rhe form
~A ~~ti t~ ~5'B~ - (~A ~SAi 5~li~ ~A ~PA ~~Sii, ~5'B~ ,i~H ~~SA. SB , S'q~.Sg~ - C ~SA~ ,
Deriviug with respe~~t. t~i .5~.~ wicl impo5in~ symmi~trv yields thc Fqiiilihriiun
yiialit~~ :~s .ti"` -m:~x{Q, (2B - 7) ~ [2(3c ~ 2~~~~)] }. The se~~n[id or~ler ~~on~lition
reqitire5 that.
- 9 ~~ ~ ~~~ ,~ (~ ~ 2~s) - r G 11. (~.1)
C'r~i~~lit.ion (~.1) is tiatisfied for all t~cltniasible valnc~s of ~ if c ) 2d~~3f.
2. ~~'e sho~x~ Niat ficm A c~nnot iorceatiE~ its profit by choositig
30.5.~ ~.a"` on .SA E[0, 1~2ry] given thnt. sg - s"`'x The proof of this seconcl
p~trt. will liro~.eecl as follows. ~Ve first cliscuss where a profit~ble deviat.ion from




~'~.A 7B~ (1 - 279tr)~ 7a
r7s~A - 30~ - 3
r3~'~r~ 4ry~~H~ ( 1 - 2sF3
(~8~~t .3L~h
Notii~t~ that ó~n,t~tis`it~yn-~a-y,,,, 1 0 since H~ ry. ~Ve have to consider two
pos,ihlv lrrofit,tble tleviations ouc to the rikht ~tnd t-he other t.o tlu~ left,.
First, ~~onsider deviations to ttte right, i.e., s,t ~ s"`. Sint~e ó`t~r,t~t7sÁ ) 0, we
hxve c?~nA~ós~,'~ ) 0 for s~ 1 s"`. Accordingly, ón;t~r7s;t is st.rit~t.ly ~~ou~-t~a in s~
on [s"`~, 1~2ry]. Sint~c a~n~~ós~.~~s -s -s.,,: G 0 the rnosb profitable chwi~tition, if it.
exists, arises at. sA - 1~2y 1.ti"`.
Second, ~~onsider deviations to the left, i.c. .S,t c s"`. The fa~~t tLat iht~
fonrth derivative is positive may imply t.hat. C73~r~~t~sA~s~~yB-s„~ C(l. Ag~tin,
since r7~~rA~BsÁ~sq-~o-s~, c fl ~i most~ profitable deviation, if it exists, arises at
sn-0cs"`.
~xObserve that the firms' strategy spaces are such that "leapfrogging", i.e., deviations for
which A 1 B' - 1- rys"` , is excluded.
31TLc~ i out lntiion oE this clitit~ttssioti for all ~~~Inr's nf H~nd ~~ is tltat ~ac La~c' t~o
slttnv tltxt
~n (srr~ s,c~)
~ ~n ~~q - l~Zry, s,~~~
~tncl
~q ~ Snc
.Sn~~ i 7fq ~'Sq - n. Snc~
}told. T~~diotts cotnptttations'" reveal that thc aho~'e is satisfied if c ~ 2H~~~3f.
rlddiu~;~ L ~tnd 2. contplc~tc~s the proof.
~`~Esart computations arr' a~'ai]ablP from the eurthors upon r~qurst.
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